A tríplice memória do poder no Brasil

INTRODUCTION

Brazil's foreign policy has regained strategic relevance at a moment when the international system is marked by geopolitical fragmentation, intensified US-China rivalry, and the erosion of multilateral cooperation. As Brazil presided over the G20, the BRICS, and COP30 over the course of three consecutive years, the country was called upon to articulate coherent positions on climate governance, development finance, global trade reform, and the regulation of emerging technologies–areas in which its voice carried weight both among established powers and across the Global South. These overlapping leadership roles amplify longstanding expectations that Brazil act as a bridge between divergent agendas, helping to reduce the widening gap between North and South at a time of renewed contestation over the rules and institutions of global governance. 

Interpreting Brazil’s diplomatic behavior in this context requires understanding how the country mobilizes its “triple memory” of power and legitimacy, that is, the Third World, the Global South, and the West. Far from abstract categories, these memories constitute a living repertoire of identity through which Brazilian policymakers navigate crises, build coalitions, and signal normative commitments. The purpose of this essay is to examine how this hybrid identity shapes Brazil’s positions in key negotiations, informs its approach to multilateral reform, and helps explain the country’s evolving role in an increasingly contested international order.

The vocabulary of world politics is also a vocabulary of memory. For Brazil, the ideas of Third World, Global South, and West form a triple memory of power and legitimacy that shapes how the country understands and performs its role in the world. Each provides a distinct lens–developmental justice, Southern solidarity, and Western institutionalism–and Brazil’s diplomacy stands out for weaving these traditions together, turning hybridity into a source of autonomy and strategic flexibility.

The clearest moment in which Brazilian diplomacy mobilized a Third World identity was during the Independent Foreign Policy (Política Externa Independente, PEI) under Presidents Jânio Quadros (1961-1962) and João Goulart (1962-1964). Inspired by the developmentalist ideas of ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) and the intellectual debates of the ISEB (Brazilian Institute for Higher Studies), the PEI repositioned Brazil within the Cold War by adopting a discourse of solidarity with the newly decolonized nations of Asia and Africa and by seeking greater autonomy from the United States. By emphasizing the North-South divide rather than the East-West conflict, Brazil incorporated anti-colonialism, the right to development, and the reform of international institutions as key principles of its foreign policy. 

Yet the term’s coherence depended on the bipolar structure of the Cold War. Once that structure eroded, so too did the concept’s analytic clarity. The end of superpower rivalry, the acceleration of globalization, and the rise of new economic poles dissolved the boundaries that had defined the Third World as an intermediary space. What had been a mobilizing identity turned into a residual label, unable to capture the heterogeneity of the post-Cold War South. The world economy had shifted toward technological interdependence and new forms of competition; the old division between developed and developing became insufficient to describe a world in which China, India, and Brazil could simultaneously be recipients of inequality and producers of power.

Out of this conceptual vacuum emerged the idea of the Global South. Initially used in the 1980s, but popularized after the 2000s, the term sought to replace the hierarchical connotations of Third World with a more inclusive and dynamic vocabulary. The Global South suggested a transnational space of shared vulnerability and potential solidarity, detached from the strict territorial binaries of the past. It emphasized common challenges such as poverty, inequality, underrepresentation without necessarily implying political alignment.

Lula da Silva’s (2003-2010) foreign policy strategically mobilized Brazil’s Global South identity to reconcile autonomy with international legitimacy. Through South-South coalitions such as the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) and the BRICS, Brazil projected itself as a spokesperson for the developing world while claiming a seat at the table of global decision-making. This approach translated historical experiences of inequality and peripheral status into diplomatic capital. By expanding ties with Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, Brazil converted solidarity with the Global South into a language of leadership, turning its post-colonial memory into a resource for influence within a multipolar order. However, the Global South carries inherent limitations: its broad scope groups very different countries under a single label, reducing analytical precision and masking internal power asymmetries. As a result, it often functions less as a coherent category than as a discursive space that provides symbolic legitimacy but lacks institutional substance.

If the Third World and the Global South represent successive articulations of the South’s voice, the notion of the West encapsulates the perspective of order, normativity, and universality. The West is not merely a geographical entity but a civilizational construct–a set of political and moral values that claim universal validity. It identifies with democracy, colonialism, rationality, and legal restraint, presenting itself as the source of international order. Historically, the West defined the standards that structured the global system, from the European balance of power to the post-1945 liberal order. 

The Western category, however, is not monolithic. It has evolved through internal contestations and external appropriations. The expansion of international society in the 20th century brought new members into the Western normative orbit, many of whom combined adherence to liberal norms with critiques of Western dominance. This “outer West,” as described by the Brazilian diplomat José Guilherme Merquior (1990), composed of countries culturally and institutionally Westernized yet historically peripheral, embodies a hybrid position: belonging to the West in values and institutions, but not in power or privilege. Such States can be defenders and dissenters of the Western project–upholding its legal and moral framework while questioning its exclusionary practices.

Brazil’s Western identity has long served as a source of prestige and international recognition. From the early Republic under Foreign Minister Barão do Rio Branco (1902-1912) to mid-century alignments with the United States, Brazilian diplomacy portrayed the country as Western outpost in the tropics. The embrace of Pan-Americanism, the defense of liberal republican institutions, and the adoption of diplomatic norms rooted in international law all reinforced Brazil’s claim to Western legitimacy. This orientation reappeared in later moments, such as during the early Cold War, when proximity to the United States was framed as a reaffirmation of Brazil’s Christian and Western values. In doing so, Brazil’s diplomacy translated its Western credentials into both legitimacy and leverage within a US-led but institutionally mediated international order.

In today’s fragmented world, these three categories of Third World, Global South, and West overlap and compete. The Third World represents the historical struggle for redistribution, the Global South embodies the contemporary discourse of recognition, and the West signifies the enduring claim to universality and power. Each offers a language through which States define their identity and pursue autonomy. But none is sufficient on its own. The moral authority of the South requires the institutional strength of the West to translate grievance into governance; the normative appeal of the West depends on the inclusion of the South to sustain legitimacy.

It is within this interstitial space that Brazil’s international identity is best understood. The country inhabits a frontier of overlapping memories–Western in its institutional origins, Southern in its historical experience of inequality, and postcolonial in its aspiration for reform. Each of these traditions represents not only a geopolitical orientation but a layer of diplomatic memory through which Brazil interprets its role in the world. From the Third World, it inherited the developmentalist critique of inequality and the moral vocabulary of justice; from the Global South, it retained the cooperative ethos of solidarity and pluralism; and from the West, it absorbed the institutional memory of legality, multilateralism, and universal norms. Brazilian diplomacy constantly revisits and recombines these memories, translating past experiences into present strategies. We will argue that the result is a hybrid identity that uses remembrance as a resource that allows Brazil to navigate competing global imaginaries and to transform historical belonging into contemporary agency.

THREE MEMORIES, MULTIPLE ROLES

Brazil’s foreign policy has long reflected a multiplicity of identities that coexist and overlap rather than exclude one another. This plurality is not accidental; it is the product of Brazil’s complex historical trajectory and its intermediate position in global hierarchies. The three foundational memories constitute the primary sources from which Brazil derives a broader repertoire of diplomatic roles. Over time, these memories have been translated into at least six interrelated roles that inform its international behavior: Brazil is simultaneously Western, Southern, middle power, emerging power, developmentalist, and autonomist. Each role provides a distinct register of legitimacy, solidarity, and action, allowing the country to adapt to changing systemic conditions without losing coherence. Together, they constitute the foundation of a diplomatic tradition that prizes autonomy through engagement and flexibility through principle.

The Western dimension of Brazil’s identity is rooted in its cultural and institutional formation. Brazil is a Latin and Christian country whose Portuguese language, while inherited from Europe, was profoundly reshaped by African and Indigenous influences. The country was shaped by the European Enlightenment and by the same juridical and humanist traditions that underpinned the modern State. Its foreign service, established in the 19th century, internalized the norms of international law, multilateralism, and professional diplomacy that originated in the West. As a result, Brazil has always perceived itself as part of the normative West, even while questioning its hierarchical structures. Its Westernness does not imply subordination but rather belonging to a community of values, including the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. From its participation in the creation of the United Nations to its longstanding support for international arbitration, multilateral diplomacy, and the development of international environmental norms, Brazil has not merely adopted global institutions originated in the West but has also contributed to their evolution, adaptation and inclusion.

Yet the country’s historical experience as a peripheral economy, the tragic experience of slavery, and a postcolonial society have also cultivated a strong Southern dimension. Brazil shares with other developing nations the legacy of dependency, inequality, and the pursuit of modernization. The rise of the Third World after 1945 offered a political vocabulary through which Brazil could articulate its aspirations for reform. The notion of a collective South–first expressed through the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77–provided a platform for demands such as special and differential treatment in trade, technology transfers, and the establishment of a more equitable economic order. Within this framework, Brazilian diplomacy combined pragmatism with solidarity, maintaining ties with Western partners while supporting structural reforms in the global system. This dual orientation allowed the country to act both as a participant in and a critic of the existing order. 

Regarding the Non-Aligned Movement, a process in which Brazil has historically played the role of observer rather than active participant, in contrast to its deeper engagement with the Group of 77, it represents, for Brazil, an extension of Latin America as an “Other West.” While Brazil’s Latin American identity rests on common history, geography, and values, its ties to the Non-Aligned Movement were largely strategic and lacked this deeper sense of belonging. On the other hand, the intellectual influence of the Non-Aligned Movement played a significant role in the strategic and military fields, particularly in the regulation of nuclear weapons, and remained attentive to the entrenchment of global hard-power structures or, in other words, to what former Brazilian Foreign Minister Araújo de Castro described in the mid-1960s and 1970s as the “freezing of power” in the hands of the great powers (Castro 1971).

Even after the end of bipolarity, when the concept of the Third World gave way to the more diffuse idea of the Global South, Brazil continued to perform this Southern identity as a way of emphasizing equality, inclusion, and development in international discourse. Far from abandoning the principles that had guided its participation in the Non-Aligned Movement or the Group of 77, Brazilian diplomacy reinterpreted them under new conditions. Through this selective appropriation of the Global South discourse, Brazilian foreign policy preserved the moral legacy of the Third World while adapting it to a multipolar environment characterized by equality, interdependence, negotiation, and strategic ambiguity.

The middle-power character of Brazil, in turn, further reinforces this dual posture. Throughout the 20th century, Brazilian diplomacy cultivated an image of moderation and mediation. It sought to influence outcomes through persuasion rather than coercion and to expand its role by strengthening international institutions. As a middle power, Brazil favors multilateralism, legalism, and consensus building, values that align naturally with its Western orientation. 

Yet this identity also expresses a deeper structural condition shared by other middle powers of the Global South: a position of dissatisfied integration. These States are embedded within the existing order and benefit from its stability, but remain marginalized in its decision-making hierarchies. Their ambition is therefore reformist rather than revolutionary–to democratize global governance without overturning its foundations. Brazil’s long-standing commitment to institutional reform, from the League of Nations to the United Nations and the G20, reflects this aspiration. Its presence and interest in multilateralism, since the early 20th century, stem from its condition as a country that has not had, and still does not have, only “specific interests,” but rather “general interests” in the functioning of a stable yet reformed world order. This blend of loyalty and critique defines Brazil’s diplomatic temperament and exemplifies the broader reformist vocation of Southern middle powers.

During Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Presidency (1995-2002), Brazil acted in ways consistent with a middle-power identity, seeking influence through coalition-building, institutional engagement, and norm entrepreneurship rather than coercive power. The strategy of “autonomy through integration” embodied this approach: by participating actively in international regimes, such as the World Trade Organization, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the UN system, Brazil aimed to strengthen the rule-based order while increasing its capacity to shape it. Cardoso’s diplomacy was guided by a logic of “critical convergence” with the Western mainstream, combining alignment with universal norms of democracy and liberalization with persistent criticism of global asymmetries (Vigevani, Oliveira & Cintra 2003).

The more recent emerging-power identity, in turn, captures the transformation of Brazil’s international status in the early 21st century. Economic growth, political stability, and active diplomacy projected the country as one of the new poles of the post-Cold War world. The formation of coalitions such as the BRICS and IBSA institutionalized this perception, granting Brazil a seat among the voices calling for a multipolar order. Unlike the middle-power role, which emphasizes moderation, the emerging-power posture is aspirational: it demands reform of global governance structures to reflect contemporary power distributions. Brazil’s campaign for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and its leadership in climate and development agendas exemplify this ambition. The emerging-power identity thus complements the Western and Southern ones by situating Brazil as both a reformist actor and a responsible stakeholder–a country that challenges inequities while preserving systemic stability.

Closely linked to these roles is Brazil’s developmentalist role, which has provided a domestic foundation for its external behavior since the mid-20th century. The pursuit of industrialization, technological progress, and social inclusion shaped the country’s foreign policy choices. Development has never been merely an economic objective; it has been a moral and political principle through which Brazil measures its standing in the world. The developmentalist ethos bridges its Western belief in modernization and its Southern solidarity with the underdeveloped. This identity continues to inform contemporary Brazilian diplomacy on issues such as energy transition, environmental governance, and financial institutions reform. The argument for a fairer distribution of technological and environmental responsibilities draws directly from this long tradition.

All these layers of identity converge under the overarching principle of autonomy. Autonomy has been the central aspiration of Brazilian foreign policy since the early 20th century, interpreted in different historical moments as distance, participation, or diversification. During the Cold War, “autonomy through distance” (Ernesto Geisel Presidency 1975-1979) meant avoiding entanglement in the superpower rivalry. With democratization and economic liberalization, the aforementioned “autonomy through participation” (Fernando Henrique Cardoso Presidency 1995-2002) reflected the conviction that influence could be gained from within institutions rather than from isolation. In the 21st century, Lula’s “autonomy through diversification” (Vigevani & Cepaluni 2007) expressed the belief that Brazil’s independence lies in its capacity to engage multiple arenas simultaneously without exclusive alignment. Autonomy thus acts as the connective tissue that allows Brazil’s multiple identities to coexist coherently. It is less a fixed position than a method of adaptation, ensuring freedom of maneuver amid systemic change.

MEMORIES, ROLES, AND STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY

The coexistence of Western and Southern elements in Brazil’s foreign policy produces what we may describe as strategic ambiguity. Rather than a symptom of indecision, ambiguity functions as a diplomatic resource. By maintaining multiple affiliations, Brazil preserves flexibility and autonomy. Its Western orientation provides access to institutions, credibility, and normative legitimacy within the West and beyond; its Southern solidarity ensures moral authority and representational legitimacy among developing nations. Between these poles, the country can adjust its emphasis according to circumstance–acting as a bridge, a mediator, or a critic as needed. In multilateral forums, Brazil speaks the language of universal principles while simultaneously invoking particularistic claims for reform. This dual discourse allows it to inhabit both the center and the periphery of the international system, embodying the paradox of being Western enough to engage the great powers and Southern enough to represent the marginalized.

This adaptation method refers to Brazil’s capacity to adjust and contribute to the evolution of international norms in ways that reflect both its interests, memory, and systemic stability. The country has played a role in the calibration rules that allow the international legal order to function under real-world conditions of temperature and pressure. This adaptive approach can be seen, for example, in the principle of special and differential treatment in international trade, and in the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities in environmental matters. These two norms reflect Brazil’s long-term interest in working within Western frameworks–using and adapting Western norms–rather than seeking to reform or replace Western-led institutions themselves.

In recent years, this pattern has become particularly visible as Brazil seeks to reassert its international role. The current administration has revived multilateral engagement and reaffirmed democratic and environmental commitments, projecting once again the Western and developmentalist dimensions of its diplomacy. At the same time, it has reinvigorated ties with Africa, Latin America, and Asia, emphasizing the Southern and emerging-power aspects of its identity. The simultaneous presidencies of the G20 and BRICS provide ideal platforms for performing this hybridity. In the G20, Brazil defends reform of global governance through consensus and legality; in BRICS, it advances the discourse of multipolarity and inclusive development. Across these forums, autonomy remains the guiding principle: to lead without aligning, to reform without destabilizing.

It is important to remember that the strategy of multiple identities in the case of Brazil also stems from the macro conditions of permissibility in the international system, to recall a concept by Hélio Jaguaribe (2008). It derives from the country’s position in South America: as a country without territorial disputes in the regional context and historically distant from the main centers of tension in the world order. This gives flexibility and a margin of discretion that many countries, whether larger or smaller, are unable to exercise. It allows Brazil to act with more soft power and less hard power. In this sense, Brazil’s regional neighborhood functions as the “self” of its diplomatic circumstance, granting depth and substance to the Latin American layer of its international identity.

This strategy is not without tension. Balancing multiple identities requires constant recalibration. Economic constraints, domestic polarization, and the growing rivalry between the United States and China test Brazil’s capacity to maintain equidistance. Yet these challenges also demonstrate the resilience of its plural identity system. The country’s foreign policy endures precisely because it is not bound by a single narrative or memory. Its Western, Southern, middle-power, emerging-power, developmentalist, and autonomist layers provide a repertoire from which to draw, depending on context. Such flexibility enables Brazil to remain relevant in a world of shifting hierarchies and diffuse power.

Ultimately, Brazil’s diplomatic distinctiveness lies in its ability to turn hybridity into agency. Rather than aspiring to fixed alignment, it seeks recognition through mediation and recognition. Its long-standing commitment to multilateralism, legality, and development gives this pursuit coherence, even as the international system becomes more fragmented and contentious. The country’s multiple identities do not cancel one another out; they reinforce a single purpose: to achieve autonomy through participation. In a global order increasingly divided between rival projects of hegemony, Brazil’s position between the West and the Global South illustrates a different possibility–the exercise of power through plurality, the practice of leadership through ambiguity, and the pursuit of influence through balance.

DIPLOMATIC MEMORY

Diplomatic memory in Brazil’s foreign policy operates beyond mere recollection of past experiences. In fact, it functions as a reservoir of meaning through which legitimacy is continuously rearticulated. Each of the three global categories that shape Brazil’s identity constitutes a distinct layer of remembered legitimacy. The interplay between memory and legitimacy also reveals how Brazil transforms identity into strategy. Legitimacy, in the Brazilian case, is not derived from domination but from mediation, from the capacity to translate principles across different normative worlds. By invoking Western legality while recalling Southern solidarity, Brazil anchors its diplomatic legitimacy in continuity rather than rupture, in reform rather than revolution. Their agency stems precisely from the creative use of memory: the ability to remember the margins while speaking from within the center.

In conclusion, David Hume’s account of memory reveals that it is not merely a passive storehouse of impressions but an active faculty that, while “tied down” (Hume 1739) to the original order of experience, also shapes how personal and collective identity are perceived. For Hume, memory differs from imagination by its vividness and its fidelity to the original impression, yet it does not create identity, it discovers it by revealing the relations of resemblance and causation that link our perceptions over time. A nation’s diplomatic memory performs an analogous role: it does not invent but rather uncovers and clarifies the specific trajectory that defines its position in the international order. Through memory, both individual and collective selves recognize continuity amid change, making visible the distinctive features of their identity in relation to others. The Third World, the Global South, and the West thus constitute distinctive and active memories of Brazil’s international identities.

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Castro, João Augusto de Araújo. 1971. “O congelamento do poder mundial”. Revista de Informação Legislativa 8 (31): 37-52. http://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/handle/id/180480.

Vigevani, Tullo, Marcelo F. de Oliveira & Rodrigo Cintra. 2003. “Política externa no período FHC: a busca de autonomia pela integração”. Tempo Social 15 (2): 31–57.

Vigevani, Tullo & Gabriel Cepaluni. 2007. “Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification”. Third World Quarterly 28 (7): 1309–1326.

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Submitted: June 15, 2026

Accepted for publication: June 26, 2026

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