The energy, climate and nature transitions are usually debated as separate agendas, each with its own institutions, metrics and capital. That separation may be convenient, but it no longer describes the economy we need to build. The bioeconomy is where the three transitions meet. It converts biological resources, processes and knowledge into goods, services, energy and information. It must therefore decarbonize production, keep ecosystems functioning and distribute income to the people who live in them, all at once. Brazil’s G20 Presidency called it a new productive paradigm: “an economic system that focuses on sustainably using renewable biological resources, such as plants, animals, and microorganisms, to produce goods, services, information, and energy, respecting the limits of ecosystems and maintaining the provision of ecosystem services.”^[1]

The scale explains the political interest. The global bioeconomy is estimated at US$ 4 trillion today and could reach US$ 30 trillion by 2050, roughly a third of global economic value (NatureFinance & FGV EAESP 2024; NatureFinance 2025e)^[2]. Yet around US$ 7 trillion still flows every year into activities that harm nature, while the annual biodiversity financing gap is estimated at US$ 700-900 billion (NatureFinance 2024c; 2024d). The bioeconomy is therefore not mainly a debate about definitions. It is a debate about where capital goes to, what it rewards and which countries capture the value.

This essay keeps the chronology of how that agenda emerged, but its argument is economic. The first phase is the long period in which biological production became a policy and industrial capability. The second is the G20 cycle under Brazil and South Africa and its arrival at COP30 in Belém. The third is implementation through the Bioeconomy Challenge and regional market-building. Across all three, the question is the same: can Brazil turn natural endowment into productivity, competitiveness and shared prosperity? This develops an argument first published in this journal at the close of the Brazilian Presidency (Furtado 2024).

BEFORE THE G20: A PARADIGM WITHOUT A SHARED NAME

For most of its history, the bioeconomy was not a shared agenda but a series of national bets. By 2024, the G20 stocktake had identified more than sixty national and regional strategies related to bioeconomy or biosciences (NatureFinance & Sustainable Finance Coalition 2025). They reflected different endowments. The European Union built on an established industrial base, with annual turnover of about €2.2 trillion and €657 billion in value added. The United States bioeconomy was valued at US$ 959.2 billion, or 5.1% of GDP. China projected CNY 22 trillion by 2025, while India recorded annual growth of 14% (NatureFinance & FGV EAESP 2024; NatureFinance 2025e). The point is not that these figures are directly comparable. They are not. The point is that governments had already recognized biological production as a source of growth.

Definitions followed national interests. In industrialized economies, bioeconomy often meant biotechnology and the replacement of fossil inputs. In nature-rich countries, it meant biodiversity, forests and traditional knowledge. Both views were valid, but they spoke past each other. Without a common language, strategies could not be compared, sustainability claims could not be assessed, and capital could not price opportunity or risk. The G20 process did not need to eliminate those differences. It needed to make them intelligible.

[DESTAQUE]Brazil practiced bioeconomy long before it used the word. Program Proálcool, established in 1975 by Decree No. 76,593, turned an agricultural commodity into a liquid-fuel industry. Its deeper legacy was capability: agronomy, industrial fermentation, logistics and a domestic market able to absorb bio-based products. Half a century later, the same foundation supports cellulosic ethanol and sustainable aviation fuel. (...)Brazil’s advantage did not begin with biodiversity alone. It began with the ability to turn biology into industry.

Brazil practiced bioeconomy long before it used the word. Program Proálcool, established in 1975 by Decree No. 76,593, turned an agricultural commodity into a liquid-fuel industry. Its deeper legacy was capability: agronomy, industrial fermentation, logistics and a domestic market able to absorb bio-based products. Half a century later, the same foundation supports cellulosic ethanol and sustainable aviation fuel. The stocktake records Raízen’s ethanol-based SAF route, GranBio’s cellulosic biorefinery, Embrapa’s biorefining research and the Brazilian Biorenewables National Laboratory (NatureFinance & FGV EAESP 2024). Brazil’s advantage did not begin with biodiversity alone. It began with the ability to turn biology into industry.

Two less visible strands reinforced that capability. Brazil built more than thirty years of rules on access to genetic heritage and benefit-sharing. The 2015 law shifted the system towards regulating results, helping move the country from about 3,000 access applications in fifteen years to more than 70,000 applications and 17,000 registered products on SisGen. Credit and innovation policy also mattered. The Low-Carbon Agriculture Program financed crop-livestock integration and nitrogen fixation, while EMBRAPII, with BNDES support, channeled R$ 3.24 billion into corporate research and development (NatureFinance & FGV EAESP 2024). None of this was labeled a single bioeconomy policy. Together, it was an apprenticeship in producing more value from biology.

THE G20 CYCLE: FROM RIO TO JOHANNESBURG

Brazil’s G20 Presidency transformed that dispersed experience into an international economic agenda. The G20 Initiative on Bioeconomy was organized around science, technology and innovation; the sustainable use of biodiversity; and the bioeconomy as an enabler of sustainable development. Its premise was clear: bioeconomy should be positive for climate, nature and people. A support group of nineteen private-sector, academic and civil-society organizations accompanied the process. In May 2024, the process produced a stocktake of G20 strategies. In September, negotiators, multilateral banks, financial institutions and civil society met in Rio to launch Financing a Sustainable Global Bioeconomy, as the G20 approved the ten High-Level Principles (NatureFinance 2024a; World Bioeconomy Forum & NatureFinance 2024; NatureFinance 2024b). The achievement was not another meeting. It was a common frame for economies representing 87% of global GDP and 80% of emissions.

The Rio de Janeiro Leaders’ Declaration recorded ten voluntary, non-binding principles covering sustainable development and food security; inclusion and the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities; mitigation and adaptation; biodiversity and fair benefit-sharing; circularity and restoration; responsible science and traditional knowledge; coherent policy and decent jobs; transparent sustainability criteria; cooperation and finance; and country-specific approaches (G20 2024). Together, they became the first plurilateral framework for global bioeconomy development (NatureFinance 2025a).

Two features matter. First, the principles are voluntary–their value depends on translation into metrics, finance, trade and investment. Second, they are deliberately plural–forest products, industrial fermentation and gene editing do not share the same economics or risks. The typology of Nature-Intensive, Advanced and Hi-Tech bioeconomies was designed to hold that diversity in one frame (NatureFinance & Sustainable Finance Coalition 2025). The conceptual work was necessary. But concepts do not build markets.

Brazil also created a domestic counterpart. The country entered 2024 with partly competing visions advanced by Uma Concertação pela Amazônia, the Brazilian Coalition on Climate, Forests and Agriculture, and WRI Brasil’s New Economy for the Brazilian Amazon, which argued that the regional bioeconomy must move beyond extractivism (NatureFinance & FGV EAESP 2024). Decree No. 12,044 of June 5, 2024 established the National Bioeconomy Strategy, created the National Bioeconomy Commission and provided for a national development plan spanning bioindustry and biomanufacturing, biomass, terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, and sociobioeconomy (Brasil 2024). The institutional architecture exists. Delivery remains the test.

South Africa kept the Initiative on the G20 agenda and moved the discussion from declarations to instruments (NatureFinance 2024c). Its first G20 Initiative on Bioeconomy (GIB) meeting in February 2025 focused on investment pipelines, enabling policy, capacity and financial data. It also exposed a hard fact: Africa captures less than 10% of the final value of its biomass. In May, the second meeting placed finance at the center, framed aligned trade as a US$ 2.04 trillion opportunity and launched the African Bioeconomy Finance Hub (NatureFinance 2025c). The shift was important. The question was no longer what bioeconomy meant, but who would finance it and who would capture its value.

Implementation also revealed the risk of overdesign. One exercise produced roughly 5,000 possible indicators and was criticized for complexity, regional bias and feasibility. Trade discussions identified a “biodiversity premium” that markets often fail to recognize: bioplastics regulated as conventional plastics, barriers to biofertilizers and few incentives for bio-based alternatives. Metrics are indispensable, but a system no one can use will not mobilize capital. Under South Africa, the Initiative therefore began the harder work of turning principles into practical tools (NatureFinance 2025a).

BELÉM: THE BIOECONOMY ENTERS THE CLIMATE REGIME

Belém moved the agenda beyond the G20 and into the climate regime. Bioeconomy was formally recognized as a pathway to advance Nationally Determined Contributions under Strategic Objective 29–Bioeconomy and Biotechnology–of the COP30 Action Agenda. The Conference dedicated two thematic days to the subject and appointed the first COP30 Special Envoy for Bioeconomy (NatureFinance 2025a; 2025b). This gave the agenda permanence and political visibility.

But Belém did not solve the financing problem. A year earlier, the route from Baku had been framed as a test of whether wealthy countries would again resist environmental finance and whether capital could move toward nature-rich countries (NatureFinance 2024c). COP30 delivered an institutional foothold, not a financial settlement. That distinction matters. Recognition creates a platform. Only investment creates an economy.

BRAZILIAN CASES: AMAZON, CERRADO AND INDUSTRY

The Amazon is where Brazil’s bioeconomy is most advanced in narrative and most fragile in execution. Sociobiodiversity generated R$ 4.24 billion in local income in Pará in 2019, while more than thirty value chains are estimated to generate R$ 5.4 billion (NatureFinance & FGV EAESP 2024). Yet a mapping of 141 financial mechanisms across the Pan-Amazon found a diverse but fragmented landscape, despite blended finance already accounting for 57.5% of the mechanisms. The problem is not simply scarcity. It is architecture: fragmented initiatives, difficult access and instruments poorly matched to local businesses (NatureFinance 2025d). More capital matters. Capital that can reach the territory matters more.

The Cerrado presents the inverse challenge. The task is not primarily to build value chains from standing vegetation, but to prevent agricultural expansion from consuming what remains. The Innovative Finance for the Amazon, Cerrado and Chaco initiative combines farm loans, farmland funds, corporate debt and capital-market instruments to move producers towards more sustainable models (NatureFinance & FGV EAESP 2024). The Low-Carbon Agriculture Program created a public-policy precedent. The next step is to use private capital to scale production systems that generate more output, resilience and value from the same land.

Industry is the third case and the largest in potential value. The Brazilian BioInnovation Association and Embrapa estimate that the bioeconomy could generate US$ 284 billion in annual industrial revenue by 2050, equivalent to about 57% of Brazil’s current industrial sector, led by bioenergy, biochemicals, biofuels and alternative proteins (NatureFinance & FGV EAESP 2024; NatureFinance 2025e). The Brazilian debate often treats Amazonian sociobioeconomy and the bioindustrial complex of the South and Center-West as rival definitions. That is a false choice. The three bioeconomy types can coexist within one country and even one value chain (NatureFinance & Sustainable Finance Coalition 2025). Brazil’s opportunity lies precisely in connecting them.

THE BIOECONOMY CHALLENGE AND THE ROAD TO 2028

The Bioeconomy Challenge was launched in Belém on November 17, 2025, to carry the ten principles into practice by 2028. It is a three-year platform for governments, companies, academia, civil society and communities. More than 63 organizations from over 20 countries had expressed interest at launch, and the initiative is convened and supported by Brazil’s Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, NatureFinance, FAO, the IDB Group, UNCTAD and WRI (NatureFinance 2025b; Bioeconomy Challenge 2025). Its purpose is straightforward: move from broad political agreement to scalable solutions.

Governance is shared. NatureFinance serves as Executive Secretariat; a Steering Committee brings together governments, business and civil society and is chaired by Brazil’s National Secretary for Bioeconomy; and an Advisory Group adds technical support (NatureFinance 2025b).2 Participation is open and free, but it is not meant to be passive. Organizations pledge to the principles, align strategies, set measurable goals and report progress (Bioeconomy Challenge 2025). The platform's value will depend less on membership than on what members deliver.

Four working groups address the gaps exposed by the G20 cycle: metrics and indicators, led by FAO; financing mechanisms, led by the IDB Group through Amazonia Forever; market development and trade, coordinated by UNCTAD; and sociobioeconomy and community benefits, coordinated by WRI (NatureFinance 2025a; 2025b). By 2028, the ambition is a Global Bioeconomy Monitoring Framework, greater alignment on definitions and viable markets that reduce investment risk (Bioeconomy Challenge 2025). These are not technical side issues. Without comparable metrics, suitable finance and demand, the bioeconomy remains a collection of promising projects rather than a productive system.

SCALE, GOVERNANCE, INCLUSION AND THE ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL

The decisive issue is allocation. Redirecting even a small share of the roughly US$ 7 trillion invested annually in nature-harming activities would change the scale of the bioeconomy (NatureFinance 2025a). The instruments already exist: venture capital, green bonds, sustainability-linked loans, nature credits and nature-based solution funds. They do not need to be reinvented, but they must fit businesses ranging from Amazonian producers to global pharmaceutical companies (NatureFinance 2024b). The repeated constraints are equally familiar: unsuitable finance, perceived risk, regulatory uncertainty and weak metrics (Netto, Brito & Furtado 2024). The bottleneck is not a shortage of financial vocabulary. It is the failure to connect capital with viable production.

Brazil enters this phase with influence and exposure. It chairs the Steering Committee and has used its Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change to help create the Challenge around Strategic Objective 29, building on the Brazilian and South African G20 Presidencies (NatureFinance 2025b). Three risks stand out. The first is isolation: the bioeconomy can flourish inside climate forums and remain marginal to mainstream economic decisions. The second is comprehension: if the concept requires endless explanation, it will struggle to compete for attention and capital. The third is continuity: voluntary principles and rotating Presidencies are only as strong as the institutions, companies and markets that carry them forward.^[3]

Inclusion is not an accessory to the Brazilian model. It is part of its comparative advantage. Bioeconomy is not automatically positive. Without equity, it can repeat conventional patterns of extraction and inequality. Indigenous Peoples, traditional communities and quilombolas are not stakeholders to be consulted after value has been created; they are rights-holders and producers whose knowledge and stewardship make much of that value possible (NatureFinance 2024a). The Pan-Amazon mapping reaches the same operational conclusion: conventional financial metrics often fail to reflect the timelines and realities of community and forest enterprises (NatureFinance 2025d). A model that cannot reward the people who keep ecosystems functioning is not sustainable and will not scale.

A REGIONAL TURN: FINANCE HUBS, MARKET ALLIANCES AND A LATIN AMERICAN PLATFORM

A regional shift is now visible. Africa did not stop at endorsing the principles. It built its own instrument. The Bioeconomy Finance Hub, co-led by the African Natural Capital Alliance and NatureFinance, was presented to the GIB in May 2025 as a pan-African platform for policy incentives, leadership, investment pipelines and standards. Its diagnosis is competitive, not merely environmental: African economies capture less than 10% of the final value of their biomass while losing about US$ 195 billion a year in natural capital through degradation, deforestation and unsustainable agriculture (FSD Africa & NatureFinance 2025c). The Hub has entered implementation through an eighteen-month process to develop priority roadmaps and a three-year program (FSD Africa & NatureFinance 2025a).

The Hub sits alongside a market strategy. The Bioeconomy Coalition of Africa aims to make the continent a destination for investment, map biological resources and position them for buyers and development partners (Bioeconomy Coalition of Africa 2026). Capability-building supports both. In 2024, the African BioGenome Project’s Open Institute delivered 31 workshops, reached more than 3,500 registrants across 50 countries and trained 401 researchers, while recommending that genomics be integrated into national bioeconomy strategies (Hayah, Ezebuiro, Kagame et al. 2025). Africa is bringing finance, markets and capability together. That is the model to watch.

Europe is moving along the same axis. The 2026 Global Bioeconomy Summit in Dublin includes the launch of the Bio-based Europe Alliance and discussions on the policies, markets and metrics needed to scale bio-based solutions (Global Bioeconomy Summit 2026). The signal is clear: the phase of defining the bioeconomy is closing. The phase of organizing regions to attract capital and place products in global markets has begun.

Brazil led the structuring phase through the G20 Initiative, the High-Level Principles, Goal 29 and the Bioeconomy Challenge. It has not yet built the commercial and financial instruments for the next phase. A Latin American platform for bioeconomy solutions could do for the region what the African Hub and the European Alliance seek to do elsewhere. It would not start from zero. The Pan-Amazon mapping has identified 141 mechanisms and the coordination failure that fragments them (NatureFinance 2025d). IDB’s Amazonia Forever and UNCTAD’s BioTrade are already engaged through the Challenge (NatureFinance 2025b). The region shares biomes, value chains and buyers. What it lacks is a single door through which investors, buyers and partners can access a credible pipeline. Leadership created the agenda. Coordination must now create the market.

The Brazilian case for bioeconomy has never rested on virtue. It rests on endowment: biodiversity, water, renewable energy, science, industrial capability and competitive agriculture. These are strategic assets for Brazil and for the global climate transition (Netto, Brito & Furtado 2024). The economy is fully dependent on nature. The G20 made that dependence visible to global economic governance. Visibility, however, is not value. The next step is to turn endowment into advantage.

CONCLUSION

Bioeconomy is the synthesis of the transitions because it rejects the trade-offs that still organize much of the debate. Decarbonization comes from changing what is produced, not only abating emissions. Conservation is financed by the value of functioning ecosystems, not positioned against production. Inclusion becomes a condition of supply because value chains run through Indigenous territories, riverine communities, quilombolas and smallholders. Brazil already holds the pieces: fifty years of industrial biology since Proálcool, three decades of benefit-sharing rules, valuable sociobiodiversity chains, an estimated US$ 284 billion industrial opportunity and a national strategy with governance in place.

The competitiveness argument follows from connecting those pieces. Bio-based value chains can diversify exports towards low-carbon trade in a world where biodiversity-based products already account for 17.16% of global trade (NatureFinance 2025e). They can increase the value captured from biomass that Brazil still exports with too little processing. They can also make supply chains more resilient to physical climate risks. Productivity and sustainability meet here not as a slogan, but as a simple economic proposition: create more value from the same hectare, keep the ecosystem intact and share the income.

What is missing is the plumbing: comparable metrics, finance that matches the timelines of forest and community enterprises, and markets that reward rather than penalize the biodiversity premium. Brazil has already done the political work of putting bioeconomy on the tables of the G20 and COP30. The remaining task is domestic, commercial and financial. The test is simple: does capital reach the territories, and does the new economy create more value than the one it replaces? If not, bioeconomy will remain an attractive concept. If it does, it can become Brazil’s development strategy.

Notes

[1]The definition is drawn from the Brazilian G20 Presidency's Bioeconomy Initiative Issue Note (G20 Brasil 2024). The wording quoted here follows the working analysis of the High-Level Principles prepared in June 2024 in support of the G20 Initiative on Bioeconomy. Official issue note: https://g20.gov.br/pt-br/documentos/notas-coceituais/2803-bioeconomy-initiative-issue-note-g20-brasil-rev-dates-2.pdf.

[2]Figures drawn from different sources are not additive: valuation methods and definitions of the bioeconomy vary between the studies cited, as those studies themselves note. This caveat applies throughout, and particularly to the comparison of national bioeconomy valuations in the second section.

[3]Statements attributed here to the process itself–the four pillars agreed at the first GIB meeting under the South African Presidency: the criticism of the first indicator exercise, the “biodiversity premium” in trade discussions, the composition of the Bioeconomy Challenge Steering Committee, the adoption of the three-type typology as a communication device–draw on the minutes of the meetings of the Support Group to the G20 Initiative on Bioeconomy held on  June 17, 2025 and  January 28, 2026, circulated to members by NatureFinance on  June 23, 2025 and  February 6, 2026. The author participates in that group.

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Submitted: September 8, 2026

Accepted for publication: MONTH Day, 2026

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