Global Climate Governance in the Age of Geoeconomics

CLIMATE GOVERNANCE UNDER STRAIN

The Paris Agreement–now a decade old–has demonstrated its value. It established full decarbonization of the world economy as a shared horizon, catalyzed a significant shift in energy investment towards renewables and helped embed net-zero commitments across the global economy. These achievements illustrate the capacity of global governance to drive structural change, even if progress remains inadequate to meet the Paris Agreement’s central goal of limiting warming to 1.5 °C.

Yet global climate governance is now under acute strain. Rising nationalism, increased defense spending, and intensifying trade conflicts are fragmenting the international system. Interdependence, once a driver of efficiency, is increasingly treated as a vulnerability to be managed or weaponized. In this context, climate action–dependent on cooperation and scale–risks being sidelined.

The dual challenge for global climate governance today is therefore to hold the line on ambition while accelerating implementation, reforming incentives and institutions so that commitments are not only made but met. 

This paper examines, first, the geopolitical and institutional pressures constraining the Paris system. It then sets out a focused agenda for COP30 and beyond: accelerating the energy transition, mobilizing finance at scale, re-gearing global climate governance for implementation, strengthening accountability in the Action Agenda, and deploying geoeconomic instruments that align trade and climate policy.

THE PARIS AGREEMENT: ACHIEVEMENTS AND SHORTCOMINGS

The Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015, delivered some very significant and concrete results. Before it, end-of-century warming was projected at around 3.6 °C. With countries’ Paris pledges fully implemented, that figure would fall to about 2.7 °C. Additional commitments made at COP26 in Glasgow could, if delivered, lower it further to around 2.1 °C (UNEP 2021). It established the full decarbonization of the world economy as the shared horizon of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction. It triggered a wave of commitments from States, businesses, investors, cities and local authorities, to reach net-zero GHG emissions. It led to the implementation of 2030 climate and development plans, through Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), providing the framework for low- and zero-carbon investments. It shifted investments in the energy sector towards renewable energies compared to fossil fuels, from US$ 1.5 trillion of investment in fossil fuels and US$ 1.2 trillion in renewable energies in 2015, to US$ 1.2 trillion of investment in fossil fuels and US$ 2 trillion in renewable energies (IEA 2025); and it contributed to the creation of an estimated 67 million green jobs (IEA 2024a). 

But the Paris Agreement has, so far, not been able to deliver the emission reductions necessary by 2030 to be on the right path to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. The emission reduction gap in 2030 between the targets set in NDCs and the net-zero pathway is estimated at 14 gigatons (Gt) of CO2 for a below 2C pathway; and this gap increases to 22 Gt for a 1.5 °C pathway (UNEP 2024). 

RULEBOOK COP: AMBITION WITHOUT IMPLEMENTATION

Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement rulebook at COP24 in 2018, global climate governance has also remained relatively static. COP26 in Glasgow and COP28 in Dubai gave a strong boost to the voluntary commitments by non-State actors–businesses and investors, cities and local authorities. But most of these commitments lack transparency and accountability frameworks to make them credible (Climate Chance 2022).

To be a “COP of implementation”, translating commitments into action, COP30 must deliver on key outcomes from COP28 in Dubai and COP29 in Baku: the Dubai decision outlining energy transition components (tripling renewables, doubling energy efficiency by 2030, and transitioning away from fossil fuels) of the Paris Agreement first Global Stocktake (UNFCCC 2024); and the Baku decision setting a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) for climate finance, including mobilizing US$ 300 billion by 2030 for developing economies (excluding China) via public instruments, and a broader goal of US$ 1.3 trillion in investments through private finance.

GEOECONOMIC HEADWINDS

A defining characteristic of the new landscape is the second US departure from the Paris Agreement, which provides a substantial boost to the fossil fuel industry and undermines the climate policies of the Biden era, including tax credits for renewable energy and electric vehicles. This is occurring within a global context marked by the fragmentation of global markets along geopolitical lines, disruptions to global supply chains driven by economic security concerns, decoupling between the US and China and their respective spheres of influence, and the rise of friendshoring (IMF 2023).

The central question therefore becomes: how can global climate action advance at the necessary speed and scale when geopolitical considerations outweigh economic logic?

This creates a decidedly suboptimal environment for global climate action. As the International Energy Agency (IEA) emphasizes, achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 requires unprecedented levels of international cooperation (IEA 2023). Without such cooperation, we are more likely to reach net-zero closer to 2090 than 2050, primarily due to lost economies of scale and their impact on lowering prices, unresolved trade and competitiveness issues, and the reduced effectiveness and increased cost of research and development when disjointed.

A FOCUSED AGENDA FOR DELIVERY

The strains on global climate governance do not remove agency. They underscore the need for a sharper, more practical agenda that links ambition to delivery. COP30 will not resolve all structural tensions, but it can consolidate progress and set reform in motion. This requires advancing on three fronts: concrete sectoral transitions, scaled-up finance, and institutional reforms that embed implementation into the heart of the Paris system.

Energy Transition

Renewable energy is trending positively, with current policies targeting a 2.7x increase in installed capacity by 2030 (IEA 2024b)–close to the required tripling. Key challenges persist: insufficient investment in supporting infrastructure (energy storage, demand-side management, grid connections), and a skewed distribution of renewable investments. A dedicated renewable energy facility, particularly for solar in Africa, is needed to lower financing costs and mitigate investment risks.

Energy efficiency trends are concerning, as the global rate slowed from 2% to 1% in 2024 (IEA 2024c). Reversing this trend is crucial. Instead of simply adding renewables to meet rising demand, increased energy efficiency must drive the transition away from fossil fuels. This requires a quadrupling of energy efficiency improvements.

Finally, a structured, just, and orderly transition away from fossil fuels remains elusive. To align with net-zero goals, fossil fuel demand must decrease by 25% by 2030 (IEA 2023)–a target currently unmet. NDCs should specify fossil fuel demand reductions, not just emission reduction targets. Major importers like the EU, China, and India are key. The rapid electric vehicles deployment in China challenges fossil fuel demand projections, increasing the risk that further investments in fossil fuel production will not generate returns.

A broader discussion is needed on what constitutes a just and orderly transition on the production side. Left entirely to market forces, the shift away from fossil fuels risks concentrating production in countries with the lowest costs and highest resilience to price volatility–notably Saudi Arabia and other Gulf producers. This would be inequitable, as it would penalize higher-cost producers regardless of their carbon intensity, while rewarding States whose fiscal capacity already allows them to weather transition shocks. A fairer approach would take into account both the carbon intensity of production (disfavoring, for instance, emissions-intensive shale oil) and the right of low-income countries–historically low emitters–to use part of the remaining production space to support development. Brazil, as a relatively low-carbon producer and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member, is well positioned to lead this debate at COP30.

For fossil fuel producing nations like Brazil, the transition is primarily an economic and fiscal challenge, not just an energy one. Therefore, it demands the attention of Finance Ministers, not just Energy Ministers. Repurposing existing infrastructure (e.g., refineries for bioenergy), workforce training, and securing alternative revenue sources are critical. This broader discussion requires the active engagement of the circle of Finance Ministers at COP30.

The Roadmap to US$ 1.3 Trillion of Climate Finance

Public Finance: US$ 300 billion by 2030

Delivering on the Baku COP29 commitment to mobilize US$ 300 billion annually by 2030 for developing economies (excluding China) through public instruments, and the broader US$ 1.3 trillion goal through private finance, is crucial (UNFCCC 2024). Unlike the US$ 100 billion annually public finance target–only met in 2023 (OECD 2023)–, these figures are grounded in robust analysis. While the US$ 300 billion falls short of the US$ 500 billion deemed necessary by the High-Level Independent Expert Group (Songwe et al. 2022), the inclusion of the US$ 1.3 trillion private finance target is a breakthrough. This number reflects the estimated investment gap between the total cost of energy, food, and nature transitions (including adaptation and resilience) and the capacity of developing countries to self-finance through domestic savings.

Mobilizing the US$ 300 billion through public instruments requires innovative funding sources, such as fiscal consolidation, increased military spending, and reduced Official Development Assistance (ODA) limit budget contributions. This commitment is not charity, but a mutually beneficial investment in shared climate and development goals. Public funds should prioritize adaptation and loss and damage, which lack commercial profitability for businesses, but offer clear macroeconomic benefits for governments. International taxation on GHG emission sources is the only viable and technically sound way to unlock new grant and concessional funding beyond scarce ODA resources.

COP30 can catalyze climate finance by establishing a coalition to tax the emissions from international air travel. This progressive tax (voluntary on economy class) would target business/first-class tickets and kerosene used by private jets, aligning the "polluter pays" principle with common but differentiated responsibilities. As a global solidarity levy (not an international tax), revenues collected by developed countries would support climate action in developing countries, while revenues collected by developing countries would bolster domestic resource mobilization. 

Leveraging the Full Potential of Institutional Investors

To achieve the ambitious US$ 1.3 trillion private finance goal, scale is paramount. Despite being much talked about, the current annual mobilization of blended finance–US$ 15 billion (Convergence 2024)–is far from sufficient. Institutional investors–including pension funds, insurers, and sovereign wealth funds–manage assets worth tens of trillions of dollars globally. Yet only a very small share is allocated to emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs), despite their significant investment needs for the energy transition (ODI 2022). This suggests a systemic inefficiency, not an inherent unprofitability. EMDE banks already hold portfolios of profitable clean energy projects, but these rarely reach global investors. 

Robust, country-led platforms are essential. The purpose of these country platforms is to consolidate government efforts, prioritize investments, establish green taxonomies, build project preparation facilities, reform policies and regulations, and deepen capital markets. Good progress is made on this front. However, these are only a foundation. The key is creating a large-scale, self-sustaining reinvestment mechanism.

The proposed reinvestment mechanism^[1] would work in the following way: Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) would proactively acquire existing, profitable, operational low- and zero-carbon projects from local commercial banks and national development banks in EMEs. Releasing capital, these local banks and national development banks could then reinvest in new projects aligned with NDCs, accelerating the transition. To facilitate this, MDBs must structure these projects into diversified, investment-grade portfolios. Critically, MDBs must provide guarantees against macroeconomic risks (policy, foreign exchange) that local banks cannot manage, making these portfolios palatable to institutional investors. They would then be sold on to institutional investors with the funds used to promote climate action.

This proposed reinvestment mechanism links the entire financial value chain, uses the sophistication of global financial markets, leveraging each actor’s strengths: governments (enabling regulation), local banks (local expertise), MDBs (de-risking and securitization), and institutional investors (scale).

The primary obstacle lies in the global prudential framework. Basel III (for banks) and Solvency II (for insurers), designed post-2008 to enhance financial stability, require capital reserves proportionate to perceived risk. But these regulations often fail to adequately recognize the risk-mitigating effect of MDB guarantees on projects in EMEs. In assigning risk weight, these regulations may prioritize geographical origin over the guarantee itself, even when provided by institutions such as the World Bank.

While these regulations should not be relaxed, Basel III and Solvency II need some revision. As the Green Guarantee Group has recommended (Gonzalez Esquinca et al. 2025), more transparent and standardized practices would enable greater access for EMEs. By establishing clear and standardized requirements for these guarantee programs, we can increase investor confidence and unlock greater flows of capital towards low- and zero-carbon projects in EMEs. Following these recommendations, financial stakeholders might be more encouraged to participate in climate and development projects in EMEs.

Without addressing this regulatory obstacle, a valuable flow of capital in the energy, food and nature transitions will not reach countries in need. COP30 can catalyze transformative change by initiating a formal dialogue with the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to revise Basel III and Solvency II. By enabling those revisions, the low risk of MDB-guaranteed assets should be accounted for, creating a re-investment mechanism within the existing framework and contributing to the achievement of the US$ 1.3 trillion climate finance roadmap adopted in Baku.

Gearing Climate Governance towards Implementation

In addition to these two concrete deliverables on the energy transition and the roadmap to US$ 1.3 trillion of climate investments, COP30 needs to deliver much needed reforms in global climate governance. Currently, global climate governance is better at setting ambitious targets than establishing the conditions for their implementation. It is also more adept at formulating norms and standards than crafting effective incentives for meeting them.

Bridging the gap between ambition and action must now be the primary objective of global climate governance. This demands significant changes to the system's design and its incentive structures, and stronger alignment with global trade and finance frameworks. It also demands a new approach to mobilizing the private sector in support of global climate action. This reform agenda must also be adapted to the evolving geopolitical and geoeconomic context, where economic security and sovereignty are paramount.

Reforming global climate governance requires a multi-layered approach: first, transforming the COP process to prioritize implementation; second, enhancing the transparency and accountability of the broader Action Agenda; and third, forging stronger linkages between climate action and global trade, finance, industrial, and innovation policies.

The COP Process

The COP framework must undergo a fundamental transformation. There is an urgent need to shift the focus of discussions toward concrete, effective implementation. Currently, these critical conversations are often sidelined and confined to the Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI).

Turning COPs into catalysts for real-world action requires more than just reordering priorities; it also demands a change in the composition of those involved. Presently, negotiators predominantly lead the SBI’s work, resulting in politicized debates that are disconnected from practical realities and lack the technical expertise essential for overcoming implementation challenges. 

Implementation will inevitably involve ongoing negotiations–particularly around issues of finance, equity, and accountability. It will therefore not eliminate negotiation but redefine its scope and locus. Negotiations must now move beyond plenary rooms attended solely by negotiators to include implementers who hold real authority and leverage. Going forward, COPs must bring in policymakers from relevant sectors–energy, transport, construction, industry, and agriculture–and, crucially, representatives from finance ministries and central banks, who are essential for translating commitments into action.

Moving beyond the Consensus Rule

The consensus rule significantly diminishes COP's efficiency. While this rule was logical when setting shared global objectives, it is now a major impediment to implementation. Those who oppose faster climate action weaponize the consensus requirement to slow the process, creating a deadlock. The irony is that changing COP's governing rule itself requires a consensus decision.

Rather than focusing on amending formal procedures, which is unlikely, COP Presidencies can utilize their discretionary power to foster implementation. They could establish an Implementation Forum, bringing together sectoral policymakers, finance ministries, central banks, businesses, investors, cities, and local authorities. This forum's sole purpose would be to unlock the barriers hindering climate action.  It would reinforce the real economy signals on the progress happening on the ground and weaken obstructionist strategies employed by some countries.

Action Agenda: Improving Transparency and Accountability

The Paris Agreement introduced a significant innovation in global climate governance: the mobilization of non-State actors–businesses, investors, cities, and local authorities. This stemmed from analyzing the failures of COP15 in Copenhagen (2009), where negotiations devolved into a clash of national sovereignties between the US and major emerging economies like China, India, Brazil, and South Africa.

More broadly, governments were often overly cautious in setting climate targets. They underestimated the innovative potential of low- and zero-carbon technologies, overestimated decarbonization costs, and yielded to interest groups favoring the status quo. Engaging businesses, investors, cities, and local authorities, who often pursued more ambitious action than their governments, helped to recalibrate these calculations and contribute to more ambitious outcomes.

When the US initially withdrew from the Paris Agreement under President Trump, the "We Are Still In" coalition–comprising US states, cities, businesses, and investors committed to climate action–sent a powerful message.^[2] This coalition demonstrated that, regardless of the federal government's decision, a significant portion of the US economy would remain committed to and deliver on the Paris Agreement's objectives. This was a direct result of the non-State actor mobilization leading up to the Paris negotiations, proving its strength and resilience.

COP26 in Glasgow (2021) and COP28 in Dubai (2023) further amplified the role of non-State actors, yielding some positive outcomes. These included the Global Financial Alliance for Net-Zero (GFANZ), a coalition of financial institutions such as asset owners, asset managers, banks, insurers, and pension funds committed to achieving net-zero emissions.^[3] In addition, these COPs launched several Race to Zero initiatives targeting various sectors of the economy, including energy, transport, construction, and industry (UNFCCC 2022). 

However, the lack of a transparent monitoring framework to track progress on these voluntary commitments led to widespread accusations of greenwashing. Unlike governments, which are subject to some degree of scrutiny both at national and international level, non-State actors have been, until now, free from that pressure. A decade after Paris, tracking the impact of the numerous initiatives launched at COPs–nearly 500 (IPCC 2021)–has become virtually impossible. Most initiatives rely on peer-to-peer review mechanisms, rather than oversight by an independent authority, to report on progress, creating potential conflicts of interest. As a result, the credibility of the Action Agenda has been significantly eroded, with both effective and ineffective initiatives facing accusations of greenwashing, many of which are justified. The Action Agenda no longer plays the constructive role it had during the negotiation of the Paris Agreement.

Therefore, it is now crucial to conduct a thorough audit of all initiatives within the Action Agenda. This audit should identify and select only those initiatives that have robust transparency and accountability frameworks in place and discontinue support for the remainder. Furthermore, all initiatives should align with the recommendations from the Paris Agreement's first Global Stocktake, demonstrating how they contribute to the implementation of countries' NDCs.

Putting the Climate emergency Brake: A Protocol on Methane

On the negotiation side, future COPs can deliver crucial complements to the Paris Agreement by initiating negotiations for specific protocols–or other binding legal instruments–designed to implement targeted aspects of the Agreement.

Consider methane as a prime example. Methane is a greenhouse gas with a warming potential roughly 80 times greater than carbon dioxide over a 20-year timeframe and around 25 times greater over 100 years (IPCC 2021). This potency makes it a critical target for near-term climate action. While technically straightforward and cost-effective reductions exist in the energy sector, industry, and waste management, methane emissions from agriculture and cattle pose a more diffuse challenge. 

Building upon the Global Methane Pledge–one of the Action Agenda initiatives with a strong technical foundation and a focus of government and private sector efforts since COP26 in Glasgow–a dedicated protocol offers a viable pathway forward. Just as the Montreal Protocol successfully phased out ozone-depleting substances, a methane protocol could establish a similar framework for reducing emissions, potentially using global warming potential-weighted units mirroring the ozone depletion potential units employed under the Montreal Protocol. Rapidly phasing out methane emissions could prevent as much as 0.5 °C of warming by mid-century (UNEP 2021).

Adopting a protocol on methane would provide the crucial transparency, monitoring, reporting, and verification mechanisms currently lacking in the Global Methane Pledge. This would significantly impact projected temperature increases, buying valuable time for the broader energy transition. This approach can be expanded to include other high-pollutant emissions–either within a single protocol or through separate legal instruments–and could progressively incorporate methane emissions from waste, agriculture and cattle.

Geoeconomic Toolset: Carbon Clubs and Climate-Aligned Trade Partnerships

While necessary, reforming the COP process and enhancing the transparency and accountability of the Action Agenda are relatively minor adjustments compared to the more significant changes required to adapt global climate governance to the fractured state of global markets and geopolitics.

In particular, two strategies stand out: carbon pricing clubs, which can reconcile trade and climate rules, and climate-aligned trade and investment partnerships, which can de-risk supply chains while accelerating decarbonization. Together, these measures could form a geoeconomic toolset that allows climate governance to work with today’s economic realities rather than against them.

Carbon Pricing Club

Carbon pricing is an essential–though not exclusive–tool in the policy mix for deep decarbonization. While standards, regulations, and public investment drive clean technology deployment and market transformation, a robust carbon price sends a clear and continuous signal across the economy, encouraging innovation, shifting behavior, and ensuring that the polluter pays (World Bank 2023). 

However, when carbon prices vary significantly across countries, they can create distortions: firms in jurisdictions with higher carbon prices may face competitive disadvantages, and emissions-intensive industries may relocate to jurisdictions with weaker climate policies, leading to so-called “carbon leakage.” To prevent this, mechanisms like the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) can level the playing field by applying a carbon cost to imports equivalent to that borne by domestic producers. But to be effective and legitimate, such tools must not be deployed unilaterally–they must be embedded within broader international cooperation.

This is where the idea of carbon clubs comes in. A carbon club is not a protectionist wall–it is a cooperative framework. First, unlike unilateral CBAMs, clubs are built on shared commitments, rules, and mutual recognition, reducing the risk of trade conflict. Second, a club can accommodate tiered carbon pricing structures that reflect countries’ differing capacities and levels of development, ensuring fairness while maintaining ambition. Third, club members could retain the revenues generated at the border and use them for domestic decarbonization–linking trade policy directly to climate investment. Fourth, a share of the revenues could be allocated to support climate action in developing countries, making the system not just equitable but solidaristic (Pisani-Ferry et al. 2025).

In this way, carbon clubs paired with CBAMs can help align climate ambition with economic fairness, ensuring that the global race to zero is not undercut by a race to the bottom. Nevertheless, the viability of this model is challenged by the aggressive trade policy of the US, who can retaliate against any imposition of tariffs on American companies or goods. 

Trade and investment partnership

Trade and investment partnerships for the energy transition and decarbonization must go beyond the model of traditional free trade agreements with climate-friendly add-ons. They should be purpose-built frameworks that put decarbonization at the center–structuring cooperation around the shared imperative of a just and rapid transition. That means securing reliable, diversified access to the critical materials essential for clean energy technologies–such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, rare earths, copper, and polysilicon (IEA 2021)–through long-term partnerships grounded in transparency, environmental safeguards, and shared benefits. 

But materials access is only the beginning. These partnerships should also catalyze local green industrialization by supporting joint ventures, local content requirements, and technology transfers that build domestic manufacturing capacity for solar panels, batteries, electrolyzers, and electric vehicles. The goal is not just access–but mutual resilience, co-development, and shared value creation.

To succeed, these partnerships must align trade, investment, and finance. That includes development finance and guarantees to de-risk green investment in emerging market economies, blended finance instruments to crowd in private capital, and green procurement commitments that send clear demand signals. Taxonomy interoperability–recognizing different but equivalent green classification systems–can help unlock cross-border green capital flows while respecting national priorities. Carbon markets are more politically and technically complex; while some level of cooperation may be possible, caution is warranted to avoid undermining environmental integrity or triggering unintended consequences. 

In short, a next-generation model for climate-aligned trade and investment must be rooted in co-investment, policy coherence, and deep structural transformation–not just lower tariffs.

SUPPLY CHAIN STATECRAFT

In conclusion, global climate governance must adapt to the constraints of a fractured geoeconomic landscape. The pursuit of decarbonization now operates in permanent tension with national objectives of green job creation, industrial policy, and the strategic capture of value chains.

The emphasis on economic security and resource sovereignty, while a rational response to geopolitical fragmentation, fundamentally challenges the assumption of global cooperation required for rapid climate mitigation. Paraphrasing Clausewitz, global climate action is increasingly the management of supply chains through other means. This is not necessarily a failing, but a recognition that climate action now occurs within the existing structures of global power, not outside them.

Further research must confront this reality head-on, exploring mechanisms for managing co-dependencies in a fragmented world. Critically, how can nations pursue strategic industrial policies to ensure domestic economic resilience, while at the same time fostering sufficient international cooperation to ensure overall emission reductions and manage critical co-dependencies? This requires a deeper understanding of not only the economics but also the politics of these shifting global supply chains and strategic sectors–the inherent trade-offs, the potential for conflict, and the possibilities for genuine collaboration within a framework of managed interdependence. Resource-rich developing countries should actively work to influence the structure of the supply chain and the distribution of value. Similarly, importing countries like the EU should be interested in supporting these efforts to improve access, particularly in a global supply chain that is predominantly controlled by China.  

Investigating these questions is not simply an academic exercise but a strategic imperative to adapt global climate governance to the realities of a geoeconomic world. COP30 cannot resolve these tensions overnight, but it can set the reform agenda for the coming years–one that preserves ambition, accelerates implementation, and shows that multilateralism retains value even in an age of geoeconomics.

Notes

[1]Proposed by Avinash Persaud and his colleagues at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

[2]“We Are Still In” (2017). Declaration from US states, cities, and businesses committing to Paris Agreement goals: https://www.wearestillin.com.

[3]GFANZ (n.d.). Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero: https://www.gfanzero.com/about/.

References

“We Are Still In” (2017). Declaration from US States, Cities, and Businesses Committing to Paris Agreement Goals. https://www.wearestillin.com. 

Climate Chance. 2022. “Integrity Matters: Net Zero Commitments by Businesses, Financial Institutions, Cities and Regions.” High-Level Expert Group on the Net Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities. https://www.climate-chance.org/en/library/integrity-matters-net-zero-commitments-by-businesses-financial-institutions-cities-and-regions/. 

Convergence. 2024. The State of Blended Finance 2024. Convergence Blended Finance. https://www.convergence.finance/resource/state-of-blended-finance-2024/view.

Esquinca, Karla D. G., Liam Maguire & Chris Grant. 2025. “Scaling Up Green Guarantees: Recommendations by the Green Guarantee Group.” Climate Policy Initiative, June 30, 2025. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/scaling-up-green-guarantees-recommendations-by-the-green-guarantee-group/. 

European Commission. 2023. Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). European Commission. https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en. 

GFANZ (n.d.). Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero. https://www.gfanzero.com/about/.

IEA. 2021. “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions.” International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions.

IEA. 2023. “Net Zero Roadmap: A Global Pathway to Keep the 1.5 °C Goal in Reach.” International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-roadmap-a-global-pathway-to-keep-the-15-0c-goal-in-reach

IEA. 2024a. “Mapping Green and Digital Energy Jobs.” International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/reports/mapping-green-and-digital-energy-jobs. 

IEA. 2024b. “Renewables 2024: Analysis and Forecasts to 2030.” International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/reports/renewables-2024. 

IEA. 2024c. “Energy Efficiency 2024.” International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-efficiency-2024.

IEA. 2025. “World Energy Investment 2025.” International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2025. 

IMF. 2023. “World Economic Outlook: A Rocky Recovery.” April 2023: Chapter 4 — Geoeconomic Fragmentation and Foreign Direct Investment. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2023/04/11/world-economic-outlook-april-2023. 

IPCC. 2021. “Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis.” Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1 

ODI Global. 2022. “Mobilising European Institutional Investors into Emerging Markets and Developing Economies: Three Critical Areas to Address.” Overseas Development Institute. https://odi.org/en/insights/mobilising-european-institutional-investors-into-emerging-markets-and-developing-economies-three-critical-areas-to-address 

OECD. 2023. “Climate Finance and the USD 100 billion goal.” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. https://www.oecd.org/climate-change/finance-usd-100-billion-goal/ 

Pisani-Ferry, J., Weder di Mauro, B., & Zettelmeyer, J. 2025. “Building Coalitions for Climate Transition and Nature Restoration”. Policy Brief. Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/building-coalitions-climate-transition-and-nature-restoration. 

Songwe, Vera, Nicholas Stern, Amar Bhattacharya, Eleonore Soubeyran, Rob Macquarie, Danae Kyriakopoulou & Josué Tanaka. 2022. “Finance for Climate Action: Scaling Up Investment for Climate and Development.” London School of Economics, November 8, 2022. https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/publication/finance-for-climate-action-scaling-up-investment-for-climate-and-development/. 

UNEP, UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre. 2021. Emissions Gap Report 2021: The Heat Is On. https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2021. 

UNEP. 2021. “Global Methane Assessment: Benefits and Costs of Mitigating Methane Emissions.” United Nations Environment Programme and Climate & Clean Air Coalition. https://www.unep.org/resources/report/global-methane-assessment-benefits-and-costs-mitigating-methane-emissions. 

UNFCCC (n.d.). Race to Zero Campaign. https://climatechampions.unfccc.int/initiatives/race-to-zero/. 

UNFCCC. 2022. Global Climate Action Portal (NAZCA). https://climateaction.unfccc.int. 

UNFCCC. 2024. UN Climate Change Conference - United Arab Emirates Nov/Dec 2023. March 15, 2024.  https://unfccc.int/documents/637073.

UNFCCC. 2024. “Draft decision -/CMA.6: New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance.” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/docum. 

United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). 2024. Emissions Gap Report 2024. https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2024.

World Bank. 2023. “State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2023.” World Bank Group. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/39796.

Submitted: August 4, 2025Submitted: August 4, 2025
Accepted for publication: September 3, 2025

Copyright © 2025  CEBRI-Journal.  This  is  an  Open  Access  article  distributed  under  the  terms  of  the  Creative  Commons  Attribution  License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original article is properly cited.