The Tariff Policy of the Trump 2.0 Administration

"Do not check your phones." This has been a recurring phrase among experts^[1] commenting on the United States' new tariff wave since the beginning of President Donald Trump's second term on January 20, 2025 (United States 2025a). This warning highlights the volatility of the current trade landscape, in which new measures are announced abruptly through executive orders that affect different sectors and multiple countries.

The Trump 1.0 administration was characterized by a return to unilateralism, tariff increases (them being effective or not), the paralysis of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body, and a trade confrontation with China, marking a departure from the principles that have guided the multilateral trading system since the post-war period. Trade liberalism and international economic cooperation^[2] have given way to an agenda of "economic nationalism,"^[3] epitomized by the slogan "America First" (United States 2025b).

Trump's second term suggests an intensification of this approach. Although the legal grounds used to impose the new tariffs are essentially the same as those used between 2017 and 2021, there has been an expansion in scope: the current measures affect a greater number of sectors and a broader range of countries.

Given this scenario, this policy paper analyzes the new US tariff cycle based on the measures announced between January and April 2025 by the Trump 2.0 administration.^[4] The objective is to identify the primary tariff actions adopted, based on the legal grounds that support them (Section 2), and to analyze the reactions of major trading partners in light of the experience gained from the previous tariff cycle (Section 3). The conclusion is presented in section 4.

US "ACTIONS": THE LEGAL BASIS OF US TARIFFS

As indicated, the frequency and volatility of announcements regarding US tariff policy contribute to the obsolescence of the analyses performed. For the purposes of preparing this article, we utilized the monitoring data published by the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), which features a broad, up-to-date, and comprehensive database of measures announced by the Trump administration (Bown 2025b).

Based on the various measures announced since January 2025, three primary and distinct legal bases for the imposition of additional tariffs can be identified: (i) Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232); (ii) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301); and (iii) the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Each of these provisions will be briefly analyzed in the subchapters below.

Although these grounds are being used to justify the adoption of additional tariffs by the Trump 2.0 administration, the legality of these measures is not clear, and there are doubts about their compatibility with the US legal system, especially regarding the division of powers between Congress and the Executive Branch (Fong & Roy 2025). This policy paper, however, does not intend to delve into this discussion in depth, limiting itself to analyzing the grounds presented by the Executive Branch for adopting the measures in question.

Section 232

Section 232 authorizes the US President to restrict imports when they are deemed a threat to national security, based on investigations conducted by the Department of Commerce (USDOC) (Fefer 2022). Since the creation of the WTO in 1995, only two investigations under Section 232 had been initiated before the Trump administration: (i) in 1999, regarding oil imports, with a favorable determination by the USDOC, but which did not result in the application of tariffs; and (ii) in 2001, regarding iron ore imports, with an adverse determination by the USDOC (Fefer et al. 2021).

During the Trump 1.0 administration, seven investigations were initiated under Section 232. In five of them, the USDOC issued positive determinations, and two resulted in the application of tariffs: 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum (Fefer et al. 2021). The application of these measures was justified by the global overcapacity of these inputs, which threatened US national security by damaging strategic national industries, such as defense and infrastructure.^[5] However, shortly after their imposition, the tariffs were temporarily suspended, allowing negotiations with strategic partners that resulted in exceptions for Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, the European Union, and South Korea (Weaver 2019). Under former President Joe Biden's administration, the tariffs were maintained, but with flexibilities such as the adoption of tariff quotas (Sheinbein & Martinez Cabello, 2025). In February 2025, the Trump 2.0 administration fully reinstated the tariffs, revoking the exemptions and flexibilities previously granted (United States 2025g). On June 3, 2025, the administration announced an increase in the then-current tariffs on steel and aluminum from 25% to 50%, which took effect on June 4, 2025, except for the United Kingdom, which was not targeted by the increases due to the US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal negotiations (United States 2025m).

In addition to reimposing tariffs on steel and aluminum, in March 2025, the president announced additional tariffs on automobiles and auto parts, justified by the increase in imports that were negatively impacting the basic industry and North American value chains (United States 2025h). In April 2025, these tariffs were adjusted to accommodate domestic vehicle assembly and the granting of tax credits under certain circumstances (United States 2025i).

Currently, Section 232 investigations are underway into imports of copper, timber, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, trucks, critical minerals and derivatives, commercial aircraft and jet engines, polycrystalline silicon and its derivatives, and drones and their components (Bureau of Industry and Security n.d.), which could result in increased tariffs on these products if the USDOC determines that there is a risk to US national security.

Section 301

Section 301 gives the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) the authority to impose retaliatory measures, including tariffs, to combat "unfair" trade practices by other countries, such as violations of international agreements or "unjustifiable" or "unreasonable" conduct that negatively affects US commerce (Schwarzenberg 2024).

Historically, Section 301 has been used more frequently than Section 232, with a total of 35 cases since the creation of the WTO (Schwarzenberg 2024). It is also used as a tool to induce compliance with trade agreements. For example, the last investigation that resulted in the application of tariffs before the Trump administration was in 2009, against Canada, regarding issues related to the Timber Agreement between the two countries (Schwarzenberg 2024).

During the Trump 1.0 administration, Section 301 was used to justify the imposition of additional tariffs on a range of products originating in China, estimated at approximately US$370 billion (Schwarzenberg 2024). The reason for applying these measures was the understanding that the Chinese government's practices regarding intellectual property and technology transfer were unreasonable, discriminatory, and burdened and restricted US trade (USTR 2018). These measures were maintained by the Biden administration, with changes to the list of affected products (Bond, Solomon, & Saccomanno, 2024), and remain in effect under the Trump 2.0 administration (United States Customs and Border Protection, n.d.).

During the Trump 1.0 administration, Section 301 was also used to investigate US Digital Services Tax practices by Austria, Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (ST&R 2025). The investigations were closed during the Biden administration, concluding that Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, and Indonesia did not apply the aforementioned tax during the period under investigation (USTR 2021a), and recommending the application of additional tariffs, followed by their immediate suspension, for Austria, India, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (USTR 2021b). In February 2025, the Trump 2.0 administration announced a reassessment of these investigations, with the intention of implementing measures against the countries involved (Ernst & Young, 2025; United States, 2025d).

In April 2025, the USTR announced the imposition of additional tariffs to address unreasonable practices, policies, and actions by the Chinese government related to its "domination" of the shipping, logistics, and shipyard sectors (USTR 2025a). The tariffs, scheduled to take effect in October 2025, will be applied to Chinese vessel owners and operators, as well as to vessels manufactured in China (Price et al. 2025). A Section 301 investigation into the Chinese semiconductor industry is also ongoing (US Department of Commerce, 2024).

On July 15 2025, the USTR, at the direction of President Donald Trump, initiated a Section 301 investigation to "determine whether certain acts, policies, and practices of the Brazilian Government related to digital commerce and electronic payment services; unfair and preferential tariffs; interference with anti-corruption efforts; intellectual property protection; access to the ethanol market; and illegal deforestation are unreasonable or discriminatory and whether they impose burdens or restrictions on U.S. commerce" (USTR 2025b). According to the USTR announcement, Brazil engaged in unfair trade practices that were restricting US exporters' access to the Brazilian market.

These practices were "detailed" in the document titled "Trade Estimates Report" (or NTE), with six pages dedicated to alleged tariff and non-tariff barriers imposed by Brazil that would impact US exporters (USTR 2025c). Among the tariff barriers, the report mentions the relatively high import tax on several sectors, including automotive, information technology and electronics, chemicals, plastics, industrial equipment, steel, and textiles; as well as the differentiated taxation on cachaça, which has a 16.25% Industrialized Products Tax (IPI) rate versus 19.5% for other alcoholic beverages; and audiovisual services, including the taxation on foreign films and content, which is "significantly higher" than that applied to domestic films and content. Non-tariff barriers include customs barriers, such as the import ban on certain remanufactured goods, import licensing procedures, and documentary requirements; and technical, sanitary, and phytosanitary barriers, including applicable regulations on the import of biofuels, wine, telecommunications products, and pork.

The report also mentions Brazilian practices involving government procurement that grant alleged preferences to domestic suppliers; intellectual property protection, with reference to Rua 25 de Março in São Paulo and the trade in counterfeit or pirated goods; patent protection, pharmaceutical protection, and protection of geographical indications, in light of the Mercosur-EU Agreement negotiations; the services sector, including audiovisual, financial, and telecommunications; and "digital barriers" to e-commerce, with reference to the taxation of digital platforms and the General Data Protection Law. The other topics mentioned in the notification of the investigation's initiation, such as electronic payment services, interference in anti-corruption efforts, and illegal deforestation, were not included in the report from earlier this year.

Immediately after the investigation began, the USTR sent a request for consultations to the Brazilian government, and the period for interested parties to submit their comments is currently open (USTR 2025c). The investigation is expected to last twelve months and will conclude with a positive or negative recommendation from the USTR for the application of retaliatory measures (Sheinbein et. al. 2025).

The IEEPA

The IEEPA, enacted in 1977, allows the president to impose economic restrictions, including tariffs, in situations classified as "national emergencies" by formal declaration based on the provisions of the National Emergencies Act (NEA) (Zirpoli 2025). Unlike Sections 232 and 301, which condition the imposition of tariffs on the conduct of prior investigations by an administrative agency—such as the USDOC or USTR—the IEEPA grants this authority directly to the president, providing only for consultation with Congress, but without requiring a specific investigation (Zirpoli 2025).

A national emergency declared under the NEA can be terminated by presidential proclamation or by the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval by Congress (Zirpoli 2025). Due to the broad scope of the provision, national emergencies have been invoked several times in American history, including to combat terrorism and to freeze the assets of individuals and entities involved with criminal organizations, for example (Casey et al. 2019). In the context of the Trump administration, the IEEPA was mentioned only once during his first term, referring to the imposition of additional 5% tariffs on imports originating from Mexico due to the "emergency at the southern border" (United States 2019). The tariffs were quickly suspended after negotiating an agreement with Mexico aimed at "reducing or eliminating illegal immigration" (Bown & Kolb 2025). In the Trump 2.0 administration, the use of the IEEPA to impose tariffs appears to be occurring more frequently.

In February 2025, the first measure under the IEEPA was announced, resulting in the imposition of additional tariffs on imports from Canada^[6] And Mexico (25%) and China (10%) (United States 2025f). The national emergency used as the basis for these measures was the illegal flow of drugs such as fentanyl from these countries to the United States (United States 2025f). In March 2025, the IEEPA was again used to justify additional sanctions, in addition to those already imposed on Venezuela (since 2015), in the form of an additional 25% tariff on oil imports. The national emergency, in this case, is associated with the impacts of President Nicolás Maduro's regime (United States 2025j).

In April 2025, the IEEPA served as the basis for applying reciprocal tariffs against several countries (United States, 2025k), calculated based on the US's bilateral trade deficits (Thorstensen & do Prado, 2025).^[7] The national emergency used as the basis for applying these tariffs was "the large and persistent annual US goods trade deficits," which resulted in "atrophy of domestic productive capacity" due to tariff and non-tariff barriers maintained by trading partners (United States, 2025e). The tariffs consist of a 10% "base tariff" (Thorstensen & do Prado 2025), which took effect on April 5, 2025, and additional tariffs ranging from 10% to 50% ad valorem for a list of more than 50 countries. The additional tariffs were scheduled to take effect on April 9, 2025, but were suspended for 90 days by Executive Order 14266.

Shortly after the imposition of the measures under the IEEPA, several lawsuits were filed challenging their legality (Zirpoli 2025b). On May 28, 2025, the US Court of International Trade (CIT) ruled that the IEEPA does not authorize the application of reciprocal tariffs or tariffs associated with drug trafficking, as it "exceeds any authority granted to the President by the IEEPA to regulate imports through tariffs" (CIT 2025). The decision was appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), which granted the Administration's motion to stay (CAFC 2025), granting suspensive effect to the CIT's decision. In practice, this means that the applied tariffs will remain in effect while the appeal is pending. The hearing is scheduled for July 31, 2025 (CAFC 2025).

On July 7, 2025, a new extension for the entry into force of the tariffs was announced, extending the date to August 1, 2025 (United States 2025n). On the same date, the president sent letters to 14 countries, informing them of the value of the reciprocal tariffs that would take effect on August 1, 2025 (United States).

Inácio Lula da Silva announced the application of an additional 50% tariff on imports from the country. The case of Brazil is especially curious, given the appearance of certain political elements in the letter, such as the mention of a "witch hunt" involving former President Jair Bolsonaro, which is unusual in the context of trade negotiations (Inskeep 2025). The letter mentions Brazil's attacks on elections and freedom of expression, as well as alleged unfair trade practices that have affected the reciprocity of the relationship between the countries. It also mentions that there will be no tariffs if Brazil (or companies) decide to build or manufacture products in the US. However, if Brazil retaliates, the US would respond in a tit-for-tat manner. On July 17, 2025, President Donald Trump released a new letter, this time addressed to former President Jair Bolsonaro, stating that he had expressed his disapproval of the treatment of the former Brazilian president "both publicly and in the form of tariff policy" (BBC 2025).

Other possible measures

In addition to the measures already announced, the administration also signaled its intention to resort to more "traditional" instruments to protect domestic industry, such as trade defense measures (United States 2025c; DeFrancesco 2025).^[8] Considering that the processes involving the application of trade defense measures tend to be longer than the tariff changes mentioned above, there is still little news on the topic at this time.

Despite this, it is worth remembering that the Trump 1.0 administration implemented two safeguard measures under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 201) – the last enforcement of which dated 2002 (Bown & Joseph 2017) – against imports of washing machines and solar panels. Both were the subject of disputes within the WTO, with conflicting decisions: one favorable and the other unfavorable to the US, as discussed in the next chapter. Therefore, it is also possible to envisage an intensification of trade defense measures in the near future.

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE TRUMP 2.0 ADMINISTRATION

Despite the similarity in the legal bases of the measures adopted by the new administration, the scope and magnitude of the measures are unprecedented. According to an analysis by economist Chad Bown (2025a), the Trump 2.0 administration's measures cover a broader range of products and sectors, including final goods—which had been relatively spared in the Trump 1.0 administration's tariffs, which focused more on intermediate goods—and affect a larger number of trading partners.

Reactions from Other Countries

So far, China, Canada, and the European Union have announced retaliatory measures in response to the imposition of US tariffs (Bown 2025a). Brazil, although it has not adopted retaliatory measures per se, has used additional "tools" to react more quickly to the US government's measures, which may be used in a context of escalation of the current situation. Therefore, this section will analyze: (i) China's reaction, considering the country's unique position in US tariff policies; (ii) the reaction of other trading partners; and (iii) Brazil's stance, as well as the impact of tariffs on the Brazilian economy. As previously noted, the objective is to provide a general overview of the responses to the tariffs, without intending to exhaust the topic.

Before delving into the specific analysis, it is pertinent to present a theoretical framework on the effects of tariffs on international trade flows. According to a study by Chad Bown and Meredith Crowley (2007), the imposition of a non-horizontal tariff barrier (i.e., one applied against a specific country) alters trade flows in four main ways: (i) destruction of trade with the target country; (ii) creation or intensification of trade with non-target countries; (iii) diversion of trade from the target country to third markets; and (iv) depression of third-party trade with the target country. In the case of non-discriminatory tariffs, such as safeguards, the effects are concentrated in the destruction of bilateral trade and double diversions, in which the affected countries redirect their exports to other destinations, including each other.

Given this theoretical framework, the imposition of a series of non-uniform tariffs by the US can generate distinct effects, and this paper will refer to them as applicable in the following subchapters.

China's Reaction

Following the lines of the trade war waged during President Donald Trump's first term, China has again announced countermeasures, in the form of tariffs, against the additional tariffs imposed by the US. However, the current scope is significantly broader: according to a survey by the PIIE (Bown 2025c), the current average tariff applied by the US against Chinese imports is 124.1%, and the current average tariff applied by China against US imports is 147.6%, both significantly higher than the levels observed during the 2018 trade war.

Despite this, there are signs of a willingness on the part of both countries to engage in dialogue. Along these lines, an agreement was recently announced between the US and Chinese governments to reduce the applied tariffs—albeit not entirely—in an attempt to avoid tariff escalation (United States 2025l). It is worth remembering that, amid the 2018 trade war, China and the US also signed an agreement to prevent tariff escalation (USTR 2020), under which China made a series of commitments to purchase US products. Although these commitments were not entirely fulfilled (Bown 2022), the agreement served to curb further tariff increases. Therefore, despite the lack of more detailed information on the nature of the announced agreement at the time of writing, a possible truce in the current trade war is not out of the question, especially given the indications that the agreement currently being negotiated between the US and China bears similarities to the agreement signed in 2020 (Fung 2025).

Furthermore, there is also a "third" option beyond retaliation and negotiation: the use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. During the Trump 1.0 administration, China used this mechanism to challenge a series of tariff increases, including: (i) the additional tariffs on steel and aluminum resulting from the Section 232 investigation (WTO 2022a) – which were also brought by several other countries; (ii) the additional tariffs resulting from the investigation into practices associated with intellectual property and technology transfer under Section 301 (WTO 2020); and (iii) the safeguard measures imposed on solar panels (WTO 2023a). The US, in turn, also filed a WTO action against the retaliatory Chinese tariffs (WTO 2023b). All of these disputes were “adjudicated” by a panel of experts in the “first instance.”

In the case of the additional tariffs on steel and aluminum, the panel concluded that the additional tariffs violated Articles I and II of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) due to their discriminatory application, given that the US only negotiated exceptions with some countries and at levels higher than those agreed upon. Furthermore, the justification based on Article XXI, which deals with national security, was rejected, contradicting the US argument that a WTO dispute settlement mechanism should not be responsible for determining whether the US's invocation of national security as a basis for a trade measure is non-justiciable. Regarding the Chinese retaliatory tariffs, a violation of the same GATT articles was also found, as they were discriminatory and exceeded the commitments made. In the case of the additional tariffs under Section 301, the panel also found that the tariffs imposed by the US violated the same two articles and were not justified by the general exceptions available in Article XX(a) of the GATT, refuting the US claim that these measures were necessary to protect public morals, including rules against unfair competition and misappropriation of intellectual property.

Finally, in the safeguards dispute over solar panels, the panel found that the US had not violated WTO agreements, rejecting China's claims that the requirements for applying these measures had not been met.

Despite the existence of these decisions, it is noteworthy that both the US and China appealed the unfavorable decisions. However, when the appeals were filed, the WTO Appellate Body no longer had a sufficient quorum, so all these disputes were appealed into a vacuum (Ungphakorn 2021), meaning they remain in a kind of legal limbo that prevents a final decision from being reached that could be adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.

Nevertheless, China has filed two new requests for consultations with the WTO based on measures adopted by the Trump 2.0 administration, indicating that the WTO dispute settlement system remains a relevant forum for addressing trade issues, including tariff policies. The two disputes filed so far involve measures adopted under the IEEPA, one concerning tariffs imposed in connection with drug trafficking (WTO 2025a) and the other concerning reciprocal tariffs imposed against China (WTO 2025b). The choice of the IEEPA as a target may be strategic, seeking a ruling by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on the incompatibility of the IEEPA with multilateral trade agreements, given that there are already rulings regarding the incompatibility of Sections 232 and 301.

Finally, regarding the practical effects of tariffs and potential changes in trade flows, China is the country most affected to date by the tariffs imposed by the US. Thus, the effects of tariffs and retaliation are primarily focused on the destruction of trade between the two countries. Considering that both the US and China are the world's largest economies, this fact suggests that there may be a significant diversion of surplus exports from these countries to others. However, it also indicates that there may be room for trade creation through the diversification of origins by these countries.

Reaction of Other Trading Partners

Besides China, only Canada (Canada 2025) and the European Union (European Commission 2025) announced countermeasures in response to the tariffs imposed by the Trump 2.0 administration. The European Union announced its suspension due to the 90-day pause in the application of reciprocal tariffs by the US. Based on the history of the Trump 1.0 administration, the same three strategies – not mutually exclusive – are observed in China's case: (i) application of countermeasures; (ii) efforts in bilateral negotiations with the US to reach an agreement mitigating the effects of the tariffs; and (iii) recourse to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.

Regarding the first strategy, although some economies have announced the application of countermeasures, none of them come close to the levels of Chinese retaliation. The adoption of milder countermeasures can also be explained by the levels of bargaining power, commercial independence, and redundancy in each country's production chains.

Thus, bilateral negotiations appear to be a more viable alternative for other US trading partners. History suggests that when the administration announces a temporary suspension of tariffs, there is room for affected countries to pursue bilateral negotiations with the US. This situation is illustrated by the suspension of Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum during the first Trump administration, which led to the negotiation of exemptions for several countries. Another example was the suspension of tariffs announced under the IEEPA against Mexico, which quickly led to the negotiation of the immigration agreement reached at the border.

Thus, while tariffs have been used as a trade policy tool to protect the US market—although the net effects of this protection on the well-being of the US economy are debated—they have also been used as leverage in negotiations. That is, during the suspension of reciprocal tariffs, the US is likely to seek agreements with affected trading partners, using access to its market as a "bargaining chip" in the negotiations.

Examples of these attempts are illustrated by the announcement of the general terms of the US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal on May 8, 2025 (United States, 2025), and the recent announcement of an agreement with Vietnam (Xiao, 2025), in addition to other ongoing negotiations. While the effects of these negotiations resolve some trade "irritants," in the words of Inu Manak, the benefits for those involved in the agreements are not 100% clear (Manak 2025). In the case of the agreement with the United Kingdom, the terms are relatively generic and reserve the most significant issues for future negotiations, while the agreement with Vietnam was perceived as asymmetrical (Manak 2025), illustrating the difficulties involved in addressing the power imbalance and reserving the truly relevant issues for future discussions.

Finally, several countries resorted to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to challenge the tariffs applied by the Trump 1.0 administration, particularly those on steel and aluminum. Turkey (WTO 2023c), Norway (WTO 2022b), and Switzerland (WTO 2022c) took the dispute further, resulting in a WTO panel ruling, which followed the same lines and conclusions as the aforementioned China dispute. Furthermore, South Korea also brought a dispute regarding the application of safeguard measures against imports of washing machines (WTO 2022d), in which the panel found that the investigation conducted by the US was inconsistent with its WTO commitments.

Although some of these decisions were also appealed in a vacuum, it is noteworthy that the countries involved in several disputes reached agreements that settled the disputes without the need for adjudication by the Appellate Body.^[9] Alternatively, without leaving them in limbo. This illustrates that, for countries other than China, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can be used as an incentive for negotiations.^[10]

Regarding the current administration's measures, Canada filed three requests for consultations with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body: one related to measures adopted under the IEEPA regarding drug trafficking; another to additional tariffs on steel and aluminum adopted under Section 232; and one to additional tariffs on imports of automobiles and auto parts under Section 232.^[11] The European Union filed a request to join the consultations in the steel and aluminum dispute. Although they are still in their infancy, the existence of these disputes may also strengthen bilateral negotiations with the US government.

Brazil's Reaction

During the current US president's first term, the Brazilian government invested in bilateral negotiations with the Trump 1.0 administration, successfully negotiating exemptions to the additional tariff on steel imports, remaining relatively "spared" compared to other US trading partners.

The Trump 2.0 administration's stance toward Brazil changed substantially after sending the letter to President Lula on JJuly 9 In addition to the imminent risk of additional 50% tariffs being imposed, based on legal and economic grounds that remain very vague, the initiation of a Section 301 investigation into Brazilian government practices and policies reveals that Brazil is unlikely to be "unscathed" again.

The Brazilian government's response to the July 9th letter came in the form of a letter signed by Vice President and Minister of Development, Industry, Commerce, and Services (MDIC) Geraldo Alckmin and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira, expressing outrage and requesting the identification of specific concerns of the US government (MDIC 2025). President Lula also spoke out, indicating that, should the threat materialize, Brazil could respond with tariffs on American products (The Guardian 2025). Following the initiation of the Section 301 investigation and the letter to former President Jair Bolsonaro, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva spoke out again, indicating the Brazilian government's negotiating stance but reiterating that he would not become "hostage to the US" (Pina & Alvim 2025).

In legal terms, Law No. 15,122, popularly known as the "Reciprocity Law," came into effect in April 2025, authorizing the Executive branch to suspend trade concessions, investments, and intellectual property obligations in response to unilateral measures adopted by third countries or economic blocs. On July 15, 2025, Decree No. 12,551 was published, regulating the Reciprocity Law and establishing the Interministerial Committee for Negotiation and Economic and Trade Countermeasures, which is responsible for determining the application of countermeasures and monitoring the respective negotiations. In other words, there are legal grounds in the Brazilian legal system for potential retaliation against US tariffs, as well as a body responsible for their implementation. Despite this, both the Law and the Decree emphasize the importance of diplomatic efforts that should accompany any decision to apply countermeasures.

It is noteworthy that the law also contemplates unilateral environmental measures, indicating their potential application against European Union regulations that impact Brazilian exports. The law's scope appears to support Thorstensen and Prado's (2025) diagnosis of the rise of a "protectionist rivalry" in global trade, marking a shift in Brazil's stance from its traditional non-retaliation stance. Although Brazil has not yet adopted any measures based on the new law, it is noteworthy to consider the possibility of unilateral retaliatory measures being taken by the executive branch.

In practical terms, the effects of US measures on international trade have also generated domestic repercussions. According to the theoretical model presented above, the application of the Trump 2.0 administration's tariffs could have two main effects on Brazil: (i) the creation of trade for Brazil in the US and China, from which Brazil could seek to occupy spaces left in these markets due to the additional and retaliatory tariffs that destroyed trade between the two largest world economies; and (ii) trade diversion, from which the additional and retaliatory tariffs would cause a redirection of surplus exports from the US and China to the Brazilian market.

In this context, the changes observed in tariff adjustment procedures are symptomatic of US tariff policy. The reactivation of the so-called "DCC list" (Calliari & Cruz 2024), authorized by Mercosur based on CMC Decisions No. 27/15 and 90/21, illustrates how the imposition of tariff barriers in other countries has affected Brazilian practices. The mechanism enables the adoption of tariff adjustments in up to 100 tariff positions, based on temporary trade imbalances resulting from the international economic situation.

The DCC list is strategic because it allows for temporary adjustments, targeted at specific sectors, upon demonstration of concrete impacts on trade flows. In the current context of global uncertainty and the reorientation of production chains, it is a crucial tool for mitigating risks and protecting vulnerable segments of the Brazilian economy. Furthermore, Brazil relies on other mechanisms for ordinary tariff changes, which allow the Executive branch, based on technical justification, to increase or reduce import tariffs to meet specific needs, such as combating inflation or stimulating competitiveness.

Furthermore, in cases where there is actual harm to the domestic industry, traditional trade defense measures, such as safeguards, anti-dumping, and countervailing measures, remain available. Although these instruments require a more complex and time-consuming process, their effects tend to be more lasting than those of emergency tariff measures.

Finally, suppose the tariffs imposed by the US violate commitments made within the WTO. In that case, Brazil can resort to the dispute settlement mechanism, as other countries have already done. Despite the current paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body, the system remains helpful in exposing potential violations of international standards and encouraging bilateral negotiations for mutually acceptable solutions to resolve disputes.

CONCLUSION

The new tariff cycle initiated by the Trump 2.0 administration represents not only a continuation but also a deepening of the trade policy implemented during his first term. While the legal foundations remain essentially the same—Sections 232 and 301, as well as the IEEPA—the scope, frequency, and intensity of the measures adopted have expanded significantly.

The imposition of additional tariffs on a diverse range of products and countries, motivated by a combination of national security, industrial policy, and economic retaliation, highlights the consolidation of a new paradigm in US trade policy. The use of tariffs as a bargaining mechanism, rather than a structural protection measure, has become an important element of the US negotiating strategy.

International reactions range from tariff countermeasures to the search for opportunities for bilateral negotiations, WTO disputes, and national regulatory initiatives aimed at developing more agile responses, as seen in Brazil's case with the enactment of Law No. 15,122/2025 and the subsequent Decree regulating it.

In economic terms, the effects of tariffs on trade flows have been multiple: destruction of bilateral trade, redirection of exports, and opportunities for integration into third countries. In the Brazilian case, there is room for strategic action, whether through bilateral negotiations or by leveraging existing legal instruments.

The current tariff context, therefore, not only challenges the norms of the multilateral trading system but also changes the previously established practice of countries regarding the adoption of unilateral measures as a way of adapting to an increasingly volatile, fragmented, and disputed global scenario.

Notes

[1] See, for example, the interview with economist Chad P. Bown (2025a), researcher at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE).

[2]For more details on the various "eras" of globalization, refer to Stanley (2023).

[3]See, for example, De Bolle (2019).

[4]This article used July 17, 2025, as the cutoff date.

[5]United States – Steel and Aluminum Products (China) Panel Report, WT/DS544/R, distributed on December 9, 2022. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds544_e.htm.

[6]Except for Canada's energy resources, which were subject to a 10% tariff instead of the 25% tariff (Bown & Kolb, 2025).

[7]A more detailed analysis of these reciprocal tariffs is available in Thorstensen & do Prado (2025).

[8]Regarding critical minerals, see United States (2025c). Also see DeFrancesco (2025).

[9]For example:
Mutually Agreed Solution, US — Steel and Aluminum Products (Mexico), WT/DS551, notified on May 28, 2019. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds551_e.htm.
Mutually Agreed Solution, US — Steel and Aluminum Products (Canada), WT/DS550, notified on May 23, 2019. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds550_e.htm.
Mutually Agreed Solution, US — Steel and Aluminum Products (Mexico), WT/DS551, notified on July 13, 2019. 2023. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds551_e.htm.

[10]US — Safeguard Measure on Washers Panel Report, WT/DS546/R, 70 score.

[11]Request for Consultations, US — Additional Duties on Autos and Auto Parts (Canada), WT/DS637/1, submitted April 3 3, 2025. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds637_e.htm.

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Received: May 13, 2025

Accepted for publishing: July 11, 2025

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